UK Provides 5,000 Missiles… Geopolitical Shifts in Global Energy Trade… A Disruptive Shock…

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Geopolitical Shifts in Global Energy Trade… A Disruptive Shock…

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Top Headlines from March 3, 2025

1. South Carolina Governor Declares State of Emergency Due to Wildfires

Over 175 wildfires have burned more than 4,200 acres across South Carolina, prompting Governor Henry McMaster to declare a state of emergency and order mass evacuations.

2. Trump to Outline Government Overhaul Plan to Congress

President Trump is set to present his plan for a significant government overhaul to the U.S. Congress. Legal challenges to his and Elon Musk’s efforts are ongoing, with the Supreme Court expected to weigh in on significant questions.

3. Zelensky and European Allies Strengthen Cooperation After Trump Meeting

Following a contentious meeting with President Trump, European leaders, including Ursula von der Leyen and Donald Tusk, have rallied in support of Ukraine. They emphasize the need for Europe to rearm and prepare for potential conflicts.

4. Cavs Secure 10th Straight NBA Victory in Overtime Thriller

The Cleveland Cavaliers extended their winning streak to 10 games with a hard-fought overtime victory against the Portland Trail Blazers. Jalen Williams scored a career-high 41 points, while LeBron James added 17 points, moving closer to a historic scoring milestone.

5. Brazil’s Oscar Win Revives Debate on Amnesty Law

The movie “I’m Still Here” has reignited discussions about Brazil’s 1979 amnesty law, which prevented prosecution for deaths and disappearances during the dictatorship. The film’s success has sparked reflection on the country’s past and present political climate.

6. Japan Deploys Nearly 1,700 Firefighters to Battle Forest Blaze

Japan has mobilized many firefighters to combat a forest fire in Ofunato. The blaze is close to buildings, and the region has experienced record-low rainfall, exacerbating the situation.

7. 97th Annual Academy Awards Kick Off in Hollywood

The Oscars ceremony began with a tribute to Los Angeles and the world of Oz, featuring performances by Ariana Grande and Cynthia Erivo. The event is taking place just months after fires devastated the city.

8. Trump’s Fentanyl Tariffs Aim to Curb Drug Trade

President Trump’s new tariffs on Chinese goods, including a 10% tariff on fentanyl precursors, aim to disrupt the drug trade. Anti-drug activists and families impacted by fentanyl support the move, hoping it will save lives.

9. Seven & i Shares Surge on CEO Departure Rumors

Shares of Seven & i, the owner of 7-Eleven, jumped following reports that its CEO, Ryuichi Isaka, may step down. The company is facing an offensive from its Canadian rival, Couche-Tard, and is considering appointing Stephen Hayes Dacus as the new CEO.

10. Miami Inter Triumphs in Texas Without Messi

Miami Inter secured a victory in Texas despite the absence of Lionel Messi. The team’s performance suggests they will remain a dominant force in the Eastern Conference this season.

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References

– 9: Seven & i bondit en Bourse, un média annonce le départ de son patron

– 10: ‘I’m Still Here’: Brazil faces past ghosts with Oscar triumph

– 11: Cavs rally to beat Blazers in OT for 10th straight NBA victory

– 12: Trump to lay out his govt overhaul plan to US Congress

– 13: Messi rests but Miami triumph in Texas

– 14: Oscars gala begins in Hollywood

– 15: Zelensky and European allies cement cooperation after Trump row

– 17: Japan deploys nearly 1,700 firefighters to tackle forest blaze

– 18: Trump’s fentanyl tariffs hold wider political aims: analysts

– 19: South Carolina governor declares state of emergency as raging wildfires prompt mass evacuations

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From Tsars to Strongmen: A Dance with Democracy?

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In Russia, vodka is not merely a drink but a mirror reflecting the nation’s soul, equal to communion and oblivion. It flows through the veins of Russian history, from tsarist feasts to Soviet prison camps, a liquid thread that has turned despair into laughter and back again. With every glass raised, the past whispers: peasants once numbed hunger under birch trees with vodka, dissidents toasted forbidden truths in cramped kitchens, and oligarchs clinked crystal goblets in gilded halls while snow swallowed the streets outside. Vodka became “the sacrament of survival”, binding people to their land even as it drowned their sorrows. It fuelled Stalin’s purges and thawed the frost between enemies; it anaesthetized prisoners in the Gulag and even helped ignite an underground rock ’n’ roll rebellion that smuggled Elvis Presley’s spirit through the Iron Curtain. To sip it is to taste the paradox of Russia itself: a nation clinging to life with ferocious vitality while flirting with annihilation. This duality—defiance of darkness and surrender to it—encapsulates the Russian experience. How can one understand Russia without understanding this paradox? The answer lies not in the bottle per se, but in the trembling hands that hold it, generation after generation, as the wheel of history grinds on. This vivid metaphor sets the stage for examining Russia’s historical dance with democracy and authoritarianism.

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The Russian Nightmare: A Legacy of Authoritarianism

Russia’s political history is a saga etched with authoritarianism—a tale of systemic repression punctuated by only brief, seismic moments of transformation. From the unyielding rule of the Tsars to the iron-fisted Soviet dictators and today’s strongmen, the nation’s narrative has been defined by despotic rulers. It is an enduring struggle between tyranny and reform, centralization and fragmentation, and a relentless tug-of-war between state authority and individual liberties.

The Bolshevik Revolution of 1917 promised a new dawn of equality but instead delivered a nightmarish reality. Under Vladimir Lenin and later Joseph Stalin, a totalitarian regime took hold, snuffing out political dissent and concentrating all power within the Communist Party. They erected a vast security apparatus (the Cheka, later KGB) to control every aspect of society. The Soviet era was marked by mass purges and atrocities—from the 1932–33 Holodomor famine in Ukraine that caused millions of deaths by hunger to the horrors of the Gulag prison camps, pervasive political assassinations, and the utter absence of personal freedom. Under Stalin’s reign, epitomized by the Great Purge of the late 1930s, hundreds of thousands of perceived “enemies” of the state were executed or imprisoned on fabricated charges, their fates sealed by the paranoia of a tyrant. Dissent in any form was met with brutal repression; many who dared oppose the regime were swiftly silenced, often through poisoning or other sinister means.

After Stalin died in 1953, there were halting attempts at reform by leaders like Nikita Khrushchev during the “Thaw.” Yet the foundations of repression remained largely unshaken. Whenever satellite states or republics pushed for liberalization, Moscow responded with force. The Soviet shadow stretched from Moscow into the heart of Eastern Europe. In 1956, Soviet tanks and troops brutally crushed the Hungarian Revolution, killing thousands and prompting roughly 200,000 Hungarians to flee the country.  A little over a decade later, on August 20, 1968, the Soviet Union led Warsaw Pact troops in an invasion of Czechoslovakia to crush the Prague Spring reforms, halting that experiment in liberalization. These interventions underscored the regime’s reliance on violence to “resolve” any challenge to its domination.

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“Gotcha?”: KGB Espionage and Continuity Under Putin

Throughout the Cold War, the KGB (Soviet Security Agency) spun webs of intrigue and deceit, turning espionage into a dark art. Nowhere was this more evident than in Moscow’s grand hotels like the Intourist and Cosmos, where visiting foreigners and even Soviet citizens could easily find their privacy invaded. The KGB famously bugged rooms and staged “honey trap” scenarios – unsuspecting guests were lured into compromising situations, their illicit liaisons or private conversations recorded through hidden cameras and microphones (The Hidden History of Trump’s First Trip to Moscow – POLITICO Magazine). These incriminating materials (kompromat, short for “compromising material”) could later be used to blackmail or discredit the targets. Intourist, the state travel agency that handled foreign visitors, effectively operated as a subsidiary branch of the KGB, vetting and monitoring all guests; the hotels under its control were, in effect, extensions of the KGB’s surveillance apparatus. Even the luxurious suites in these hotels were not safe—rooms were routinely bugged, and these tactics ensnared many a foreign diplomat or businessman during the Soviet era.

Under President Vladimir Putin—himself a former KGB officer—such practices have not only endured but, by many accounts, deepened. Using kompromat as a political weapon has been refined in post-Soviet Russia. One infamous example from the late 1990s was a leaked video of Russia’s Prosecutor General engaged in a compromising act, which Putin (then FSB head) used to his advantage in a power struggle. In the 2010s, Russian operatives even ran sting operations against opposition figures, luring them with prostitutes to bugged apartments and releasing edited “sex tapes” to the public. These KGB-era tactics have thus carried into the modern FSB era, creating an atmosphere where betrayal and blackmail are commonplace. This betrayal resonates through the corridors of power today, keeping many officials and businessmen in line via fear of personal exposure. This climate of intimidation persists as Russia projects power externally as well: from the icy expanses of Eastern Europe to the rugged mountains of Afghanistan, the drumbeat of invasion and conquest has echoed through Russian policy across centuries, reminding the world that the methods of control at home often mirror those used abroad.

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Who Started the Russia–Ukraine War?

The full-scale invasion of Ukraine began on February 24, 2022, when Russia launched an unprovoked attack on its neighbour. Some observers and political analysts have argued that actions by the West—such as NATO’s eastward expansion—created a sense of encirclement that contributed to Moscow’s aggression. Russian leaders, including Putin, have claimed they were provoked by Western interference in Ukraine. However, the overwhelming consensus of international experts and legal bodies is that Russia was the clear aggressor. NATO’s official stance describes Russia’s assault on Ukraine as “unprovoked, unjustified, and barbaric”, shattering decades of relative peace in Europe.

It is important to note that Ukraine did not initiate any attack on Russia. By the eve of the invasion, Ukraine had neither threatened Moscow nor taken actions that would warrant a military response; instead, it was pursuing closer ties with Europe and strengthening its democracy. Putin’s justifications – “denazifying” Ukraine or preventing NATO expansion – are widely dismissed as pretexts. Western officials have documented that Putin had effectively blocked Ukraine’s NATO aspirations long before 2022, and Ukraine was not on the verge of joining the alliance at the time (Lessons of the Minsk Deal: Breaking the Cycle of Russia’s War Against Ukraine | Institute for the Study of War). Thus, irrespective of debates about geopolitical provocation, Ukraine did not initiate this war. Any claim to the contrary is deliberate disinformation designed to obscure the true aggressor. The conflict began with Russia’s full-scale invasion, a blatant violation of Ukraine’s sovereignty and multiple international laws. Since then, Kyiv has been engaged in a determined defense, viewing this struggle—alongside its allies—as a war for survival against Russian imperialist aggression.

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The Hunter Biden Saga: Political Intrigue in U.S.–Ukraine Relations

The so-called Hunter Biden saga added complexity to U.S.–Ukraine relations in the years leading up to the 2022 invasion. Hunter Biden, the son of then-Vice President (now President) Joe Biden, joined the board of a Ukrainian energy company called Burisma Holdings in 2014. His involvement with Burisma raised eyebrows, given his father’s high-profile role in U.S. policy toward Ukraine. Indeed, critics often cited Hunter’s position as a conflict of interest. However, investigative reports indicate that Hunter Biden was a relatively passive board member who provided advice on legal issues and finance, and he never visited Ukraine for company business during his five-year board term (2014–2019) (What Hunter Biden did on the board of Ukrainian energy company Burisma | Reuters). Notably, extensive inquiries and witness interviews in Ukraine found no evidence that Joe Biden acted improperly or intervened to help his son’s business; U.S. officials, including anti-corruption advocates, actually pushed for reforms in Ukraine, such as the ouster of a corrupt prosecutor, aligning with international consensus – not to shield Burisma, but to tackle graft.

The situation exploded into U.S. domestic politics in 2019. President Donald Trump and his lawyer, Rudy Giuliani, pressed the Ukrainian government to investigate Burisma and Hunter Biden, allegedly conditioning U.S. military aid on Kyiv’s cooperation in digging up dirt on the Bidens. This led to a political firestorm in Washington. A whistleblower complaint revealed Trump’s phone call with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky in July 2019, during which Trump asked for “a favour” – to investigate the Bidens – while congressionally approved aid to Ukraine was being withheld. This incident resulted in Trump’s first impeachment by the U.S. House of Representatives. It was alleged that Trump abused his power by soliciting foreign interference against a domestic political rival. As the impeachment inquiry found, Trump and Giuliani’s pressure campaign on Ukraine – essentially asking Ukraine to announce an investigation into Hunter Biden – coincided with a freeze on vital military assistance, suggesting a quid pro quo.

The saga deepened in October 2020 with the emergence of a laptop purportedly belonging to Hunter Biden. A New York Post story publicised emails and personal files said to be recovered from a laptop left at a Delaware repair shop, which included details of Hunter’s business dealings and personal life. The laptop’s contents, some related to Hunter’s work with Burisma and a Chinese energy company, and others, which were salacious personal material, became intensely debated. Initially, dozens of former U.S. intelligence officials voiced suspicions that the laptop saga could be part of a Russian disinformation operation (given Russia’s known penchant for hacking and propaganda). Social media platforms briefly limited sharing of the story due to those concerns. In the years since no clear evidence has emerged that a foreign intelligence plot fabricated the laptop’s materials – many files have been authenticated – but questions linger about how the data was obtained and released. Regardless, the Hunter Biden laptop affair further polarized U.S. politics and sometimes threatened to overshadow genuine policy discussions about Ukraine. It was an uncomfortable position for Ukraine, caught in the crossfire of U.S. partisan battles. President Zelensky navigated this minefield carefully, insisting Ukraine would not wittingly interfere in U.S. domestic affairs.

The Hunter Biden saga injected additional drama into U.S.–Ukraine relations. It became a focal point for Trump and his allies, even as Ukraine was struggling with Russian aggression and internal reform. Ultimately, these controversies underscore how domestic politics (in the U.S. and Ukraine) intersect with and complicate international diplomacy.

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Trump’s Shift in Alliances Threatens Ukraine and Europe

Throughout the Cold War and its aftermath, no U.S. president ever endorsed Soviet or Russian communism; even pragmatic cooperation (like Franklin D. Roosevelt’s World War II alliance with Stalin) was rooted in necessity and survival rather than any sympathy for communist ideology (The United States, the Soviet Union, and the End of World War II). However, U.S. foreign policy has taken a sharp turn under President Donald Trump, rattling allies and adversaries alike. Trump’s approach was characterized by transactional nationalism and a disdain for multilateral institutions. While he did not openly embrace communism, critics noted what they saw as a personal affinity and admiration for authoritarian leaders over traditional democratic allies. For example, Trump frequently spoke warmly of Russia’s Vladimir Putin and was reluctant to criticize him, even as Putin cracked down on opposition and invaded neighboring countries. According to observers like former diplomat Nigel Gould-Davies, “there is that sort of authoritarian-minded chemistry” between Trump and Putin – a chemistry reinforced by Trump’s similar warmth toward other strongman leaders such as Hungary’s Viktor Orbán. This stance represented a radical departure from America’s post-World War II role as the linchpin of a liberal democratic alliance.

By 2023–2024, as Trump campaigned for a return to the presidency, he explicitly signalled a foreign policy realignment. In late 2024, Trump (the presumptive president-elect after the U.S. election) indicated that he would prioritize quick peace in Ukraine, even if it meant siding more with Russia’s terms. Once back in office, President Trump changed the geopolitical landscape significantly. The shift became evident during a pivotal United Nations vote. Under Trump’s instruction, the United States suddenly aligned with Russia against the European Union and most democracies on a Ukraine-related resolution (Trump cambia de bando | Opinión | EL PAÍS). The shocking move marked the first time the U.S. openly broke with its European allies to side with Moscow on the war. It was accompanied by Trump adopting Kremlin talking points to justify Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, effectively blaming NATO expansion and “Western provocation” for the conflict.

European leaders watched these developments with dismay and alarm. An editorial in Spain’s El País newspaper described it bluntly: “Trump changes sides”, leaving Ukraine and Europe alone to face Russia after decades of U.S.-European strategic alliance (Trump cambia de bando | Opinión | EL PAÍS). During a tense meeting at the White House, observers noted a “ceremony of intimidation” in how Trump received Ukrainian President Zelensky, culminating in this historic U.S. policy shift.

Behind the scenes, Trump’s team worked on a draft peace plan for Ukraine that heavily favored Russian interests. Everything Putin demanded, Trump seemed willing to concede: Ukraine would be barred from NATO membership; Russia would be allowed to annex the Ukrainian territories it occupied by force permanently; all U.S. sanctions on Russia would be lifted; and even Russia’s return to the G7 economic group was promised. In essence, Washington signaled it would defend Moscow’s position in international forums rather than Kyiv’s. The “rehabilitation of the invader” was to be prioritized over the humiliation of the victim. European diplomats like France’s President Emmanuel Macron and Britain’s Prime Minister (by then) Keir Starmer engaged in frantic diplomacy, visiting Washington to urge a more balanced approach – a “just peace” that wouldn’t reward aggression. But their appeals were undercut by what followed.

Trump’s approach to the proposed ceasefire and peace deal effectively required Ukraine to surrender significant sovereignty. In a plan reportedly prepared by the White House, Ukraine’s only incentive to accept these harsh terms was a joint exploitation agreement for its mineral resources – a proposal many saw as thinly veiled economic extortion (Trump cambia de bando | Opinión | EL PAÍS). Under this scheme, Ukraine would control resource-rich assets in exchange for security guarantees. President Zelensky was reportedly willing to consider painful compromises only if there were guarantees that Russia would honor the ceasefire and not simply use the pause to rearm for a new onslaught (Trump cambia de bando | Opinión | EL PAÍS). Given Russia’s past violations of agreements (for instance, disregarding the 2015 Minsk II ceasefire by launching the full invasion in 2022 (Lessons of the Minsk Deal: Breaking the Cycle of Russia’s War Against Ukraine | Institute for the Study of War)), such guarantees were viewed as highly dubious.

Not surprisingly, Ukraine balked at this one-sided deal. As Trump’s plan became clear, Ukraine (with tacit European support) decided it could not proceed, judging that the deal would sacrifice Ukraine’s sovereignty and reward Russia’s aggression without truly securing peace. The breakdown of these proposed terms highlighted a deep rift in the transatlantic alliance.

From Europe’s perspective, Trump’s “betrayal” of Ukraine was also a betrayal of Europe’s own security. Longstanding U.S. allies felt abandoned. Poland and the Baltic states, sitting on NATO’s front line with Russia, were particularly aghast that Washington would entertain letting Russia keep conquered Ukrainian territory. European Union nations began openly strategizing on how to respond in a world where the U.S. might no longer defend them. As El País noted, by changing sides, Washington forced Europe to confront the reality of defending itself – “the solitude in which the U.S. leaves Ukraine and Europe in front of Putin” (Trump cambia de bando | Opinión | EL PAÍS).

With the U.S. stepping back from its traditional leadership role, European leaders quickly closed ranks to oppose an unfavorable peace. Even traditionally cautious leaders like Germany’s Chancellor and France’s President joined Eastern European states in rejecting a Munich-style appeasement. Their worst fear was that giving in to Putin’s terms would only embolden further Russian expansionism. Indeed, history loomed large: memories of how appeasement in 1938 led to wider war were frequently invoked.

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Vance’s Controversial Diplomacy Strains Alliances

Compounding the tensions was a series of diplomatic missteps by U.S. Vice President J.D. Vance (a hypothetical VP in this scenario). Vice President Vance took an unusually confrontational tone with America’s closest partners, igniting public controversies. At the annual Munich Security Conference in February 2025, Vance stunned the audience by openly lambasting European leaders. He accused Europe of “lacking resolve”. He even claimed that the greatest threat to Europe was not Russia or China but Europe’s retreat from “fundamental values” like free speech (Vance’s attack on Europe overshadows Ukraine talks at the security conference | Reuters). He also criticized European immigration policies as “out of control.” These remarks, delivered in a blistering speech, drew immediate rebuke from key allies. Germany’s defense minister, Boris Pistorius, responded by calling Vance’s comments “unacceptable,” noting that Vance had essentially questioned the democratic credentials of Germany and Europe. Many delegates in the conference hall watched Vance’s speech in stunned silence, with scant applause at the end. The episode underlined a growing divergence between Washington and Europe. Rather than focus on unity against Russian aggression in Ukraine, the U.S. Vice President’s priority message seemed to be chastising allies, which observers warned could only delight Moscow by sowing discord among Western allies.

Shortly after the Munich incident, Vance created another stir—this time directed at the United Kingdom, one of America’s staunchest allies. During a press event, Vance made disparaging remarks that were perceived as undermining the UK’s leadership in Europe. British officials privately expressed outrage, and even the public took note; it is highly unusual for an American leader to single out Britain for criticism on the world stage. The transatlantic alliance was further strained as UK leaders – including the newly inaugurated Prime Minister Keir Starmer – wondered if the “special relationship” had frayed. This diplomatic faux pas cast a shadow over U.S.–Uk relations at a critical moment when unity was needed against Russian aggression.

Most dramatically, Vice President Vance clashed directly with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky during a visit to Washington. In a White House meeting intended to showcase solidarity, Vance’s comments to Zelensky were seen as dismissive of Ukraine’s suffering and needs. According to reports, Vance lectured Zelensky about “corruption in Ukraine” and the need to be “more grateful” for American assistance – comments that came off as highly insensitive given Ukraine’s daily fight for survival. The backlash was swift: members of both U.S. parties and European diplomats criticized Vance for “punching down” at a wartime leader who had won global admiration for his courage. Ukrainians were hurt and bewildered by the episode; to them, it was another sign of a potential weakening of U.S. resolve. The timing of these incidents could not have been worse, coming as Ukraine was desperately seeking more substantial Western unity in the face of Russia’s onslaught.

Vice President Vance’s various diplomatic controversies – which spanned from Munich to London and finally to Washington – exposed the increasingly fragile state of transatlantic relations during the current administrations under Trump. Many of Washington’s allies were left alarmed, disillusioned, and uncertain about the United States’ long-term commitment to global partnerships. The unity of purpose that NATO had displayed in earlier years appeared to evaporate at the highest political levels, creating tensions and misunderstandings, even as ordinary NATO soldiers and diplomats continued to cooperate effectively on the ground.

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Europe’s Response: The UK’s Resolve and France’s Nuclear Stance

With a potential U.S. strategic withdrawal from its traditional leadership role, European countries have been compelled to step up decisively. In effect, Europe is asking: Is Europe already at war (politically and economically) with Russia? Given the extent of European support for Ukraine, many argue the answer is yes – Europe is deeply invested in Ukraine’s defense, short of sending troops directly into combat. European governments recognize that bowing to an aggressor’s harsh demands today will only invite more significant threats tomorrow. The tone and outcome of Trump’s meeting with Zelensky in Washington – seen across Europe as an attempt to bully Ukraine into surrender – have had a unifying effect on European leaders, galvanizing them to close ranks rather than fracture. There is a growing consensus from Paris to Warsaw that appeasement will only embolden Putin, and thus, the only course is to stand firm with Ukraine.

One of the most resolute responses has come from the United Kingdom. Historically, the UK has often played an assertive role in European security, and recent developments have reinforced that trend. Despite Washington’s wavering, London has made it clear it will not see freedom falter on European soil again (a sentiment rooted in the UK’s World War II experience). The UK’s actions speak loudly. Prime Minister Keir Starmer (who took office following Britain’s 2024 elections) announced a major package of military aid to Ukraine, including 5,000 missiles and other materiel for Ukraine’s defence (UK announces new $2 billion deal to fund air-defence missiles for Ukraine | Reuters). This £1.6 billion aid deal, financed through UK export funds, will supply thousands of British-made “lightweight multirole missiles” to bolster Ukraine’s air defenses. “This will be vital for protecting critical infrastructure now and strengthening Ukraine to secure peace when it comes,” Starmer said, underscoring the UK’s ironclad commitment to Ukrainian sovereignty. In addition to missiles, Britain has provided advanced drones, artillery, and training for Ukrainian soldiers. Reports show that the UK has quietly increased its military presence in Eastern Europe as a deterrent signal to Russia.

Notably, King Charles III lent his moral support to the Ukrainian cause. In a striking show of solidarity shortly after Trump’s policy shift, King Charles received President Zelensky for a private audience at Sandringham Castle. The visit – replete with cheers from the British public during Zelensky’s stop in London – stood in stark contrast to the incredible reception Zelensky had in Washington a few days prior (the UK gives a royal welcome to Zelenskyy after White House meltdown – Mikro-Makro / Mikro Detaylar Makro Tartışmalar). The UK gave Zelensky a royal welcome, with King Charles formally “holding an official audience as a show of support after the Trump clash”. This highly symbolic meeting, unprecedented in modern times for a monarch and a wartime foreign leader, sent a clear message: Britain’s support for Ukraine transcends politics and is rooted in principles of justice and courage. At the same time, Prime Minister Starmer convened an emergency defense summit in London with other European leaders (and even partners like Canada and Turkey) to coordinate a united front on Ukraine). At this summit – held in early March 2025 – European nations discussed concrete steps to fill any gap left by the U.S. and to ensure military and financial aid to Ukraine continues uninterrupted. The UK, in essence, signalled that if Washington “changes sides,” London and Europe would forge ahead on their own to resist

Russian aggression.

Parallel to the UK’s efforts, France has made a landmark announcement regarding its nuclear forces. France, one of the two nuclear-armed states in the EU (alongside the UK), historically kept its nuclear arsenal strictly under its own control as a pillar of its national sovereignty. However, considering doubts about U.S. reliability, President Emmanuel Macron indicated a new willingness to integrate France’s nuclear deterrent with European defense. In a major policy shift, France offered to extend aspects of its nuclear umbrella to its European allies. While Paris did not propose handing over warheads or launch codes to other countries, Macron invited European partners to engage in a “strategic dialogue” about the role of French nuclear weapons in collective security, even suggesting that allied officers could participate in French nuclear exercises (France’s Nuclear Weapons and Europe – Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik)). This move aims to strengthen Europe’s deterrence posture independently of the U.S. and is driven by multiple factors: the need to counterbalance Russia’s nuclear threats, to reassure Eastern European states, and to reinforce the message that Europe can defend itself. Macron emphasized that France’s “vital interests” now have a European dimension, implying that a nuclear attack on an EU country would be treated as an attack on France itself. Such language inches toward a pan-European nuclear doctrine. Additionally, France’s offer means European allies might have more say in French nuclear policy – a significant change from the past, when Paris guarded its autonomy closely. While details remain to be worked out (and some smaller EU states remain skeptical or nervous about nuclear matters), this initiative reflects France’s resolve to “fill the gap” in deterrence if the U.S. security guarantee weakens. It also echoes proposals by former officials (like ex-NATO chief Anders Fogh Rasmussen) that Europe should consider pooling its nuclear resources (French and British) to provide a credible continental deterrent

Such dramatic measures underscore how deep the concern is in Europe about the uncertain future of U.S. support. Europe is even willing to contemplate what was long unthinkable: using frozen Russian assets to fund defense and reconstruction. The EU and G7 have frozen around $300 billion in Russian central bank reserves as well as oligarch assets. European leaders, such as Czech Prime Minister Petr Fiala, have argued that Europe should seize or leverage this frozen money to support Ukraine’s military and bolster European defenses, rather than burdening European taxpayers (Europe must raise defence spending, use Russian assets for Ukraine, Czech PM says | Reuters). “For further military support of Ukraine, we must use money from frozen Russian assets across Europe,” Fiala declared in a national address, also calling for higher European defense budgets. EU officials are actively examining legal mechanisms to channel at least the interest proceeds from these assets (if not the assets themselves) into aid for Ukraine. The idea is popular: why not make Russia foot the bill (indirectly) for the damage it caused? Indeed, plans are underway in Brussels to direct tens of billions from Russian funds into a fund for Ukraine’s recovery and Europe’s enhanced defense. This extraordinary step – essentially liquidating an aggressor’s assets to pay for the victim’s security – would set a powerful precedent in international relations.

In summary, Europe’s response to the challenges has been robust: Britain is re-arming Ukraine and rallying allies; France is extending nuclear assurances; and the EU at large is upping defense spending and considering creative financial warfare against Moscow. Europe is effectively telling the world that, if the U.S. falters in its democratic leadership, Europe will rise to the occasion. This newfound European resolve will inevitably have far-reaching consequences for transatlantic relations and the future security architecture of the continent.

Failed Peace Initiatives: The Minsk and Istanbul Agreements

It is important to recognize that the Russia–Ukraine war did not erupt without numerous prior attempts at peace. Two major diplomatic efforts in the past decade—the Minsk Agreements and the Istanbul talks—sought to resolve conflict between Russia and Ukraine, but both ultimately failed, underscoring the deep mistrust at play.

The Minsk Agreements (2014–2015): In the wake of Russia’s initial incursions into eastern Ukraine in 2014 (shortly after it annexed Crimea), Ukraine and Russia – facilitated by the OSCE, France, and Germany – signed a series of accords in Minsk, Belarus. The first deal, often called Minsk I, was signed in September 2014 and aimed to establish an immediate ceasefire in the Donbas region. It outlined steps like pulling back heavy weapons and beginning a political dialogue on greater autonomy for the separatist-held areas of Donetsk and Luhansk. However, Minsk I failed within months as fighting continued and each side accused the other of bad faith. In early 2015, with battles raging (particularly around Debaltseve) and the Ukrainian army under severe strain, a second attempt – Minsk II – was brokered by France and Germany. The Minsk II agreement, signed in February 2015, was more detailed: it called for a ceasefire, withdrawal of heavy arms, exchange of prisoners, and constitutional reforms in Ukraine to grant limited self-governance to Donbas in exchange for Ukraine regaining control of its border. The deal was signed by representatives of Ukraine, Russia, and the Russian-backed separatist leaders (Lessons of the Minsk Deal: Breaking the Cycle of Russia’s War Against Ukraine | Institute for the Study of War). For a time, Minsk II reduced the intensity of open fighting, but ceasefire violations by Kremlin-controlled forces continued unabated. A fundamental flaw was that Russia never acknowledged its role as a combatant – the agreement did not even mention Russian troops on Ukrainian soil, treating Russia as a “mediator” rather than the instigator. This lack of accountability allowed Moscow to flout the spirit of the deal while insisting any failure was Ukraine’s. Over the next few years, Minsk II lingered in limbo: some prisoner swaps and pullbacks happened, but key political steps (like local elections in Donbas under Ukrainian law) never materialized. The ultimate collapse of Minsk II came in early 2022 when Russia formally repudiated Ukraine’s sovereignty over the Donbas by recognizing the puppet “Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Republics” as independent states – immediately followed by the full-scale invasion of Ukraine. In effect, Russia decisively broke the Minsk agreement by choosing war, confirming the fears of many that Putin had only used Minsk as a stalling tactic. The failed Minsk process demonstrated that Ukraine was willing to negotiate for peace (it had signed onto unpopular concessions in those accords). Still, Russia was unwilling to honour a genuinely sovereign and whole Ukraine. President Zelensky, elected in 2019 partly on a promise to achieve peace in Donbas, initially tried implementing Minsk (even entertaining direct talks with Putin). Still, after 2022 it became clear that Minsk was dead, and Putin had chosen invasion over diplomacy.

The Istanbul Agreement (March–April 2022): In the early weeks of the 2022 invasion, as Russian forces faced fiercer Ukrainian resistance than expected, negotiations were revived – this time in Istanbul, Turkey. In late March 2022, Ukrainian and Russian delegations met in Istanbul for intensive talks, under the mediation of Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. Ukraine, seeking to halt the bloodshed, floated a bold proposal: neutrality. President Zelensky’s team indicated Ukraine was willing to declare itself permanently neutral (foregoing NATO membership) and adopt a non-aligned status, provided it received binding security guarantees from significant powers. In essence, Ukraine would accept a status akin to Austria or Sweden during the Cold War – not joining any military bloc – if countries like the U.S., UK, Turkey, and even Russia would pledge to defend Ukraine if attacked. Additionally, Ukraine signaled openness to compromises on Crimea and the Donbas: the proposal included a 15-year consultation period on the status of Russian-occupied Crimea (deferring that contentious issue) and discussed interim arrangements for the Donetsk/Luhansk areas. These were significant concessions on Ukraine’s part, given its long-term aspirations and the devastation already wrought by Russia. Russia, for its part, announced it would “drastically reduce military activity” near Kyiv and Chernihiv as a goodwill gesture. By early April 2022, it appeared a potential deal was within reach: “Ukraine will never join NATO, in exchange for a ceasefire and foreign security guarantees.”

However, several factors doomed the Istanbul talks. First, there was enormous mistrust. Western countries urged caution, noting that Russia had a history of offering hollow promises to regroup militarily. For instance, Estonian Prime Minister Kaja Kallas and French Foreign Minister Jean-Yves Le Drian publicly warned that any Russian claims of de-escalation could be a smokescreen. Their scepticism was well-founded: even as talks proceeded, evidence of atrocities like the Bucha massacre (Russian forces killing civilians near Kyiv) emerged, hardening Ukrainian public opinion against any deal with an army committing war crimes. Second, Putin’s true intentions remained maximalist. Reports later emerged (via Reuters) that negotiators had drafted a tentative deal but was personally rejected by Putin, who instead doubled down on pursuing a military victory. Indeed, by April 2022, Russia redeployed its troops to focus on eastern Ukraine, abandoning the Kyiv area – not as part of a peace deal but because of battlefield failures. Putin likely calculated he could still win more territory by force, so why settle for a partial diplomatic win? Ukrainian officials also did not fully trust any security guarantees short of NATO’s Article 5, since Russia had just proven willing to violate Ukraine’s security assurances (like the 1994 Budapest Memorandum). As Ukrainian negotiator Davyd Arakhamia later explained, Russia offered only vague pledges and no firm enforcement mechanism, so the Ukrainians “did not trust Russia to uphold such an agreement” and refused to sign on the dotted line.

By late April 2022, the Istanbul process collapsed without a lasting ceasefire. Each side blamed the other: Moscow claimed Kyiv had “thrown away” a near-agreement at the behest of the U.S. or UK (which Ukraine denies). At the same time, Kyiv pointed to the horrific discovery of Russian atrocities and the lack of any trustworthy guarantee of Ukrainian security. In truth, the talks likely failed because Putin was not ready to accept anything less than subjugation of Ukraine, and Ukraine was not willing to surrender its people and land to an aggressor absent absolute necessity. Notably, Ukraine has consistently maintained that it is open to a just peace – including Russia withdrawing its troops – but not a capitulation. Russia ultimately walked away from balanced compromises in the Minsk period and in Istanbul. Thus, it is inaccurate to portray Ukraine as an obstacle to peace; rather, Ukraine has repeatedly sought peace but insists (rightly, in line with international law) that peace must be predicated on respect for its sovereignty and territorial integrity. The failed Minsk and Istanbul initiatives demonstrate the deep-seated mistrust: Ukraine cannot trust Russian promises, and Russia will not accept Ukrainian independence except on its own terms. This gulf must be overcome for any future peace deal to succeed.

Turkey’s Strategic Balancing Act

One notable player in the conflict and peace negotiations is Turkey, which has carefully balanced its relations with Russia and Ukraine. Turkey’s unique position arises from historical, economic, and strategic factors. As a Black Sea nation and NATO member maintaining close ties with Moscow, Turkey has labored to be a key mediator in regional tensions.

Historically, Turkey and Russia have been rivals (even enemies in conflicts dating back to the 19th-century Crimean War and beyond), but also partners of convenience in recent years. Turkey strongly supports Ukraine’s independence and territorial integrity – for example, President Erdoğan loudly denounced Russia’s illegal annexation of Crimea in 2014 and has positioned himself as a protector of the Crimean Tatars, a Turkic Muslim community oppressed under Russian rule (Where Turkey Stands on the Russia-Ukraine War | Council on Foreign Relations). Turkey has also sold Ukraine some of its most effective weapons in this war: the Bayraktar TB2 drones, which early on were celebrated in Ukraine for picking off Russian armoured columns. At the same time, Erdoğan’s government has not joined Western sanctions against Russia, seeking to maintain trade and diplomatic channels with Putin. This is partly because Turkey’s economy is deeply intertwined with Russia – from energy imports (natural gas) to tourism (millions of Russian tourists visit Turkey’s beaches) – and partly because Turkey sees a role for itself as a bridge between East and West.

Geography gives Turkey significant leverage. It controls the Bosphorus and Dardanelles Straits, the maritime choke points that connect the Black Sea (and thus Russia’s naval ports) to the Mediterranean. Under the 1936 Montreux Convention, Turkey can close the Bosporus to warships in time of war or if threatened. Indeed, after the invasion, Ankara invoked this convention to bar Russian (and other) warships from transiting the straits, a move clearly aimed at limiting Russia’s ability to reinforce or rotate its Black Sea Fleet. This demonstrated Turkey’s willingness to take concrete steps against Russia when it feels its own region’s stability is at stake.

However, Turkey also pursues “strategic autonomy” in foreign policy. It has complex, sometimes cooperative ties with Russia in other arenas: in Syria’s civil war, Turkey and Russia support opposite sides but have struck deals to avoid direct clashes; in defense trade, Turkey even purchased Russia’s S-400 air defense system in 2019, straining relations with the U.S. Thus, Turkey’s stance in the Ukraine conflict is multi-faceted. It has condemned the invasion and supported Ukraine with drones and diplomatic backing, but it has not cut off Russia. Instead, Erdoğan has positioned Turkey as a neutral facilitator – hosting prisoner exchange talks, grain export negotiations (leading to the UN-brokered Black Sea Grain Initiative in summer 2022), and the aforementioned Istanbul peace talks. Ankara’s logic is straightforward: it benefits from stable relations with both sides. Turkey cannot afford a Russia that is overly weakened (or a Russia that turns hostile towards Turkey), nor does it want a Russia that dominates Ukraine or the Black Sea. Likewise, Turkey gains prestige and economic advantages by courting Ukraine and helping it and keeping lines open to Moscow. This balancing act has become more precarious over time (Turkey’s Balancing Act on Ukraine Is Becoming More Precarious). As the war has dragged on and atrocities have mounted, pressures have grown on Turkey to pick a side more decisively. Yet Erdoğan has managed to maintain his delicate diplomatic dance – exemplified by his ability to talk to both Putin and Zelensky frequently, one of the few world leaders to do so.

Two strategic interests drive Turkey’s careful stance: Crimea and the Straits. Crimea holds emotional and strategic importance; the Ottoman Empire once ruled it, and modern Turkey feels a kinship with the Tatar minority there. Ankara never recognized Russia’s annexation and likely sees a post-Putin scenario where Crimea could potentially be negotiated over. Meanwhile, by controlling the Bosphorus Strait, Turkey holds a trump card in any naval dimension of the conflict, which it has wielded in a calibrated way (closing it to military vessels prevents Russia from, say, sailing reinforcements from its other fleets). Turkey’s NATO membership also means it quietly continues to cooperate with Western defence efforts – for instance, Turkish forces still operate within NATO air policing and other activities aimed at deterring Russia.

In conclusion, Turkey is performing a tightrope walk: it condemns Russia’s aggression and aids Ukraine, yet avoids confrontation with Moscow and even provides Putin diplomatic openings to save face. This has placed Ankara in a unique mediator role. Turkey is one of the few countries that can speak to both sides, which proved crucial in deals like the grain export agreement that alleviated a global food crisis. Turkey’s dual engagement policy will be critical in any eventual peace discussions. Its success or failure will depend on whether it can continue convincing Ukraine and Russia (and the broader West) that it is an honest broker. For now, Turkey’s stance is a reminder of the region’s complexity: not every U.S. ally has the luxury of completely isolating Russia, especially when vital interests and historical ties are in play.

Current Global Conflicts and Tensions

Beyond Ukraine, the world is grappling with multiple concurrent conflicts and flashpoints that, together, have raised the overall level of global instability. We live in a time when several regions are experiencing crises simultaneously, testing the international community’s capacity to respond and manage risks:

1)     Eastern Europe – The War in Ukraine: The conflict triggered by Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine is the largest land war in Europe since World War II. It has caused tens of thousands of deaths and displaced millions of people. NATO countries have been indirectly drawn in by providing massive military aid to Ukraine, while Russia’s actions have led to a near-total break in East-West relations. The war’s outcome remains uncertain, and its ripple effects (energy crises, food shortages due to disruption of Ukraine’s grain exports, and a rearmed Europe) are global.

2)     Middle East – Syria and Israel-Palestine: In the Middle East, Syria’s civil war still simmers on after a decade, with external powers (Russia, Turkey, Iran, the U.S.) maintaining military roles in different parts of Syria and no comprehensive peace in sight. Meanwhile, the Israeli–Palestinian conflict escalated dramatically in 2023. A bloody flare-up occurred when Hamas militants from Gaza carried out a horrific terrorist attack in Israel, leading to a devastating war in Gaza. The 7 October 2023 Hamas attack and the ensuing Israel–Gaza war triggered regional instability that Iran and its proxies sought to exploit (). In the aftermath, tensions remain sky-high: sporadic violence continues in the West Bank, and cross-border exchanges between Israel and Iranian-backed militias (like Hezbollah in Lebanon) pose the constant risk of igniting a wider regional war. The Middle East thus remains a potential powder keg, with multiple interlocking conflicts (Yemen’s war, unrest in Iraq and Lebanon, etc.) that international diplomacy struggles to contain.

3)     Asia-Pacific – Taiwan and North Korea: East Asia focuses on Taiwan and the South China Sea, where China’s growing military assertiveness has raised fears of a possible future conflict over Taiwan’s status. Chinese warplanes and ships now regularly encroach on Taiwan’s air and maritime space, and Beijing refuses to renounce the use of force to achieve “reunification.” The U.S. has reinforced support for Taiwan, and allies like Japan and Australia are increasing defence readiness, making the area a potential flashpoint between great powers. Meanwhile, North Korea’s nuclear weapons and missile programs continue to advance unchecked. Pyongyang spent 2022–2024 testing ever more powerful missiles, including ICBMs capable of reaching the U.S. mainland, and even claimed to have tested a nuclear-capable underwater drone. Kim Jong Un’s regime has adopted a “more bellicose approach” toward South Korea, punctuating rhetoric with missile launches and military demonstrations (). North Korea’s actions keep Northeast Asia in a constant state of tension, and each test provokes debates in Seoul and Tokyo about military preparedness and, in South Korea’s case, even whether to pursue its nuclear deterrent. The overlapping territorial disputes in the region (such as in the East China Sea or India–China border tensions in the Himalayas) add further complexity.

4)     South Asia – The Kashmir Dispute: In South Asia, India and Pakistan remain locked in their decades-old rivalry centered on the disputed region of Kashmir. While a ceasefire on the Line of Control has primarily been held since 2021, the area is heavily militarized, and minor incidents could spiral. Kashmir, with its history of triggering multiple Indo-Pak wars and frequent skirmishes, continues to be a flashpoint that could potentially escalate, especially given both India and Pakistan possess nuclear weapons. Moreover, any terror attack emanating from militant groups in Pakistan that strikes India (such as the 2019 Pulwama bombing) can dangerously raise war rhetoric. The international community keeps a wary eye on this region, as a major conflict there could draw in other powers and would undoubtedly pose a nuclear risk. As of now, relations between New Delhi and Islamabad are icy, and diplomacy over Kashmir is moribund – meaning the dispute festers with no resolution in sight (As Fragile Kashmir Cease-Fire Turns Three, Here’s How to Keep it …).

5)     Africa – The Sahel Region Instability: Across Africa, various conflicts persist, but the Sahel region (the belt south of the Sahara, including countries like Mali, Niger, Burkina Faso, Chad, and Sudan) has seen alarming deterioration. A combination of armed Islamist insurgencies, military coups, and humanitarian crises has created a tinderbox. Multiple countries in this zone have experienced coups in the last few years (Mali 2021, Burkina Faso 2022, Niger 2023), often ejecting Western security partnerships and turning to alternative patrons (sometimes Russia’s Wagner mercenaries). Meanwhile, jihadist groups linked to ISIS and al-Qaeda roam across borders, exploiting weak governance and fuelling ethnic violence. Sudan descended into a brutal internal war in 2023 when rival generals clashed, devastating Khartoum and displacing millions. In the Horn of Africa, Ethiopia’s fragile peace after a civil war in Tigray and ongoing instability in Somalia add to concerns. These conflicts in Africa often receive less global media attention but produce vast human suffering and have global implications (such as migration flows and opportunities for extremist proliferation).

6)     Latin America – Venezuela’s Crisis: In the Western Hemisphere, outright warfare is less prevalent, but Venezuela stands out as a country in protracted crisis. For the past several years, Venezuela has suffered an economic collapse and political standoff between the authoritarian government of Nicolás Maduro and a (now weakened) opposition that at one point formed a parallel interim government recognized by dozens of countries. While large-scale fighting isn’t occurring, Venezuela’s situation is often termed the worst humanitarian crisis in the Americas: over 7 million Venezuelans have fled the country since 2015, a refugee exodus comparable to Syria’s. The influx has tested the stability of neighbouring countries (Colombia, Brazil, and others). Additionally, organized crime and social unrest afflict parts of Latin America (such as drug cartel violence in Mexico and Central America), which, although not traditional wars, create conditions of conflict that can destabilize states and drive mass migration.

In addition to these regional conflicts, the world faces broader tensions among major powers. The United States, Russia, and China are each modernizing their nuclear arsenals, and arms control agreements have weakened, raising concerns about a new arms race (A Strategy to Defend America’s Interests in a More Dangerous World). Cyber warfare and disinformation have opened new fronts that don’t involve traditional armies but can still wreak havoc (for instance, Russian and Chinese hackers targeting Western infrastructure, or vice versa). Global challenges like terrorism persist: ISIS and al-Qaeda, while much diminished, still inspire affiliates and lone actors, and extremist ideology can always find fertile ground in war-torn regions (recent Hamas attacks and jihadist resurgence in Africa underscore this).

International diplomatic frameworks, such as the United Nations, have been strained. The UN Security Council has been largely paralyzed on big issues like Ukraine due to great power vetoes. Nonetheless, diplomacy hasn’t collapsed entirely – mediators like Turkey and the UN have scored some successes (e.g. grain deal, humanitarian ceasefires here and there). Regional organizations (the African Union, European Union, ASEAN, etc.) also attempt conflict resolution, with mixed results.

In summary, global tensions are at their highest in decades. An authoritative survey by the Council on Foreign Relations in early 2025 found that experts consider this period among the most volatile and dangerous since the Cold War’s height (Conflicts to Watch in 2025) (Conflicts to Watch in 2025). Wars in Ukraine and Gaza are raging simultaneously, raising the spectre of broader regional confrontations (Conflicts to Watch in 2025). There are confrontations in East Asia (around Taiwan and Korea) that could if mishandled, draw in superpowers. Longstanding disputes like Kashmir or the South China Sea remain unresolved and could flare up unexpectedly. All these conflicts collectively challenge world peace unparalleled in the last few decades. The international community’s ability to multitask – to simultaneously contain multiple crises–is being tested.

Assessing the Risk of World War III

Given this panorama of conflicts, many people naturally worry: Has the risk of a Third World War increased? While the situation is undeniably perilous, most analysts still assess the risk of a true global war as relatively low, though higher than it was a decade ago. In other words, the possibility of a World War III remains minimal but not zero (Ian Bremmer to News.Az: The risk of a Third World War remains, but …).

On one hand, several factors are indeed heightening the risk of a major conflagration. The war in Ukraine has brought NATO (a U.S.-led nuclear alliance) into indirect conflict with nuclear-armed Russia, something unthinkable during the calmer 1990s/2000s era. There have been a few close calls – incidents like errant missiles landing in NATO-member Poland, or intense nuclear saber-rattling from Moscow – that remind how escalation could occur. Tensions in the Taiwan Strait involve the United States and China, the world’s two strongest powers, in a potential flashpoint that could draw in Japan and others. The more those tensions rise (for example, through military exercises or miscalculations at sea or in the air), the more the risk of a direct U.S.–China clash that could spiral. And the Middle East, as seen recently, can produce sudden crises (like a regional war following an Israel–Iran showdown) that might entangle big powers on opposing sides. Each of these theaters — Europe, East Asia, Middle East — has the seeds of great-power confrontation. Moreover, Russia and China have grown closer in their strategic cooperation, often coordinating moves in a way that challenges Western interests (). For instance, they veto Western proposals at the UN in tandem, conduct joint military drills, and amplify each other’s propaganda narratives. This alignment of authoritarian powers could form a bloc in a future global conflict scenario.

On the other hand, numerous mitigating factors make a third world war unlikely. First and foremost is the understanding by all major powers of the catastrophic consequences of nuclear war. The principle of nuclear deterrence still holds: leaders know that starting a full-scale war against another nuclear-armed state is essentially suicidal. This tends to put a brake on escalation. For example, throughout the Ukraine conflict, the U.S. and NATO have been extremely careful to avoid direct military intervention on Ukrainian soil, precisely to avoid a direct NATO-Russia clash that could spiral to nuclear use. Similarly, Beijing and Washington, despite aggressive posturing, have channels to communicate and defuse incidents to prevent an accidental rush to war over Taiwan.

Secondly, the global economy is deeply interconnected (globalization may have plateaued, but it’s still significant). All major economies – U.S., EU, China, Russia, etc. – would suffer enormously in a world war scenario. This interdependence acts as a restraint: for instance, China’s economic success is still tied to access to Western markets; a war would shatter that and threaten the Communist Party’s domestic stability. So there are strong incentives to avoid war, in favor of competition below the threshold of armed conflict.

Thirdly, there remain vital international diplomatic frameworks and norms that work to contain conflicts. While often paralyzed at the Security Council level, organisations like the United Nations still operate dozens of peacekeeping missions and facilitate negotiations in various disputes. While not universally heeded, international courts and arbitration offer forums to resolve issues without violence. Multilateral treaties (like those governing the use of space or Antarctica or the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons) provide some guardrails. Even amid high tensions, communication hotlines exist between militaries (e.g., the U.S. and Russia have deconfliction lines for Syria and a NATO-Russia hotline for air incidents; the U.S. and China have naval hotlines) to prevent accidents from spiralling. These channels of communication and the legacy of cooperation in some areas (for example, arms control agreements of the past or jointly addressing issues like piracy or climate security) somewhat reduce the chance of a sudden misunderstanding igniting a war.

Furthermore, regional balances of power and alliances help deter unilateral aggression. Even if the U.S. role is uncertain in Europe, Russia must consider that a war against a coalition of European states (which collectively have greater economic power and increasingly coordinated militaries) would be daunting. In Asia, China faces not only the U.S. but also the alliance web of the U.S. with Japan, Australia, South Korea, and India’s wary presence—all of which make a quick victory over Taiwan far from assured and hence riskier to attempt.

Another key factor is that the memory of World War II’s horrors still looms large in the collective consciousness of many leaders and populations. Unlike in 1914, when world leaders underestimated how bad a global war could be, today’s leaders are acutely aware that World War III could end civilization as we know it. This creates a psychological barrier to pushing the red button, so to speak. Even leaders who speak in apocalyptic tones (like Putin’s hints at using nukes) have so far shown caution in action.

Recent intelligence assessments echo this cautious optimism. For instance, American political scientist Ian Bremmer noted that while the risk of a direct great-power war has grown, it is still “very low… certainly not zero”, emphasizing that cooler heads usually prevail when the stakes are existential (Ian Bremmer to News.Az: The risk of a Third World War remains, but …). Defense analysts also point out that significant powers often choose indirect competition (proxy wars, economic pressure, cyber operations) to avoid crossing the threshold into open conflict with each other.

That said, the risk of a world war is not zero and may rise at the margins. A miscalculation or accidental escalation remains a real danger. In a fast-moving crisis (imagine a clash between Chinese and U.S. jets over the South China Sea or a Russian missile mistakenly hitting Poland and killing civilians), domestic pressures and nationalist fervour could push leaders into a corner where they feel compelled to respond with force, potentially setting off a chain reaction of retaliation. Multiple simmering conflicts simultaneously are worrisome because they stretch diplomatic resources thin. There is also the unpredictable element: what if a regional power like Iran or North Korea provokes a conflict that spirals beyond its borders? In the Middle East, for example, the involvement of Iran and proxy militias in a broader war against Israel could draw in the U.S. on one side and perhaps Iran’s partners (or even Russia, diplomatically) on the other, raising the spectre of a larger conflagration ().

In conclusion, while the likelihood of World War III remains limited, it is higher today than it was 10–15 years ago, due to the convergence of multiple crises and great-power rivalries. The world’s major powers seem to understand the stakes and are generally acting to prevent direct clashes, but the margin for error is shrinking. Continued diplomatic engagement, clear communication, and restraint are essential to navigate this perilous period. The fact that we are even discussing world war risk after decades in which it felt nearly unthinkable is telling. It underscores the urgent need for renewed efforts at conflict resolution, arms control (especially nuclear arms control, which has been eroding), and robust international cooperation to address not just these conflicts but also the root causes – security anxieties, territorial disputes, ideological extremism, and power vacuums – that fuel them. History has shown that global wars often start not out of grand design but of miscalculation in a charged environment. Avoiding such miscalculation now is paramount.

Ultimately, a full-scale World War III can be averted despite the elevated tensions. The world’s nations, cognizant of the “catastrophic potential consequences” of such a war, have strong incentives to keep even intense regional conflicts from escalating to a global level () (). Maintaining vigilance and open diplomatic channels, strengthening international institutions, and remembering past lessons are crucial to ensure that today’s numerous conflicts do not coalesce into a single, worldwide conflagration. As fraught as the current geopolitical climate is, the continued existence of diplomatic frameworks and the mutual deterrence of destructive weaponry mean that global leaders still have the tools and the motivation to prevent World War III. The coming years will test their wisdom and resolve to use those tools wisely.

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References

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2. Higgins, A. (2017). “Kompromat: The Soviet Art of Political Blackmail Is Back in Vogue.” The Atlantic. Explains the practice of kompromat and details post-Soviet cases, including Putin-era use of sex tapes to discredit opponents (How Kompromat Works – The Atlantic).

3. NATO (2022). “Statement by NATO Heads of State – 24 March 2022.” NATO.int. Describes Russia’s February 2022 attack on Ukraine as “unprovoked” and “unjustified,” condemning the invasion and affirming that Ukraine did not provoke the war (The consequences of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine for international …).

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5. Swan, B.W. (2023). “The Burisma board, a laptop scandal and struggles with addiction: What to know about Hunter Biden’s legal troubles.” Politico (June 20, 2023). Summarizes the Hunter Biden laptop saga, noting that some contents involved Burisma and personal material, and that initial claims of a Russian disinformation plot were not substantiated by evidence (What to know about Hunter Biden’s legal troubles – POLITICO) (What to know about Hunter Biden’s legal troubles – POLITICO).

6. Spike, J. (AP) (2024). “Trump’s second term could realign US diplomacy towards authoritarian leaders.” The Irish News (Nov 7, 2024). Reports that Trump avoided criticizing Putin and showed admiration for authoritarian figures like Hungary’s Viktor Orbán, aligning with an “authoritarian-minded chemistry” between Trump and such leaders (Trump’s second term could realign US diplomacy towards authoritarian leaders – The Irish News).

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8. El País (2025). “Trump cambia de bando” – editorial (continued). Describes Trump’s proposed peace plan conceding to all of Putin’s key demands: no NATO for Ukraine, Russian annexation of occupied provinces, lifting of sanctions, and U.S. defending Russia in international forums (Trump cambia de bando | Opinión | EL PAÍS). Also notes the plan for a joint exploitation of Ukraine’s mineral resources as a form of extortion, which Zelensky was pressed to accept in exchange for a ceasefire guarantee (Trump cambia de bando | Opinión | EL PAÍS).

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10. MacAskill, A. & Holton, K. (2025). “UK announces new $2 billion deal to fund air-defence missiles for Ukraine.” Reuters (Mar 2, 2025). Reports that British PM Keir Starmer announced a £1.6 billion package for Ukraine to purchase 5,000 air-defense missiles, with manufacturer Thales producing the missiles in Belfast (UK announces new $2 billion deal to fund air-defence missiles for Ukraine | Reuters) (UK announces new $2 billion deal to fund air-defence missiles for Ukraine | Reuters).

11. Harding, L. (2025). “UK gives royal welcome to Zelenskyy after White House meltdown.” The Guardian (Mar 1, 2025). Notes that King Charles III held an official audience with President Zelensky as a show of support after Zelensky’s tense meeting with Trump. Also reports PM Starmer hosting a defense summit in London with European leaders to present a united front on Ukraine (UK gives royal welcome to Zelenskyy after White House meltdown – Mikro-Makro / Mikro Detaylar Makro Tartışmalar) (UK gives royal welcome to Zelenskyy after White House meltdown – Mikro-Makro / Mikro Detaylar Makro Tartışmalar).

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14. Higgins, A. (2023). “Lessons of the Minsk Deal: Breaking the Cycle of Russia’s War Against Ukraine.” Institute for the Study of War (ISW Backgrounder). Explains the Minsk II agreement and how Russia violated it – repeated ceasefire breaches and then the full-scale 2022 invasion – effectively nullifying the accord (Lessons of the Minsk Deal: Breaking the Cycle of Russia’s War Against Ukraine | Institute for the Study of War) (Lessons of the Minsk Deal: Breaking the Cycle of Russia’s War Against Ukraine | Institute for the Study of War).

15. Wikipedia. “Peace negotiations in the Russian invasion of Ukraine.” (accessed 2025). Details the March–April 2022 Istanbul talks: Ukraine’s willingness to consider neutrality with security guarantees, and Russian responses. Notes that Ukraine proposed neutrality with a 15-year consultation on Crimea, while Russia promised to reduce military activity near Kyiv (Peace negotiations in the Russian invasion of Ukraine – Wikipedia) (Peace negotiations in the Russian invasion of Ukraine – Wikipedia). Also includes Ukrainian official Arakhamia’s statement that Russia offered no trustworthy security guarantees and thus Ukraine’s delegation did not trust or finalize any agreement (Peace negotiations in the Russian invasion of Ukraine – Wikipedia).

16. Council on Foreign Relations – Preventive Action Project. “Conflicts to Watch in 2025 – Executive Summary.” CFR Report (Jan 2025). Summarizes an expert survey indicating that this year could be among the most dangerous in decades, with wars in Gaza and Ukraine and other hostilities (e.g., Iran–Israel tensions) identified as top concerns (Conflicts to Watch in 2025).

17. Defense Intelligence Agency (2024). “2024 Annual Threat Assessment – Statement before Congress.” (Apr 2024). Provides U.S. intelligence assessment of global threats. Notably, it states the Hamas attack in Israel (Oct 2023) triggered regional instability that Iran is exploiting, with heightened conflict risk in the Middle East (). Also assesses North Korea’s continued missile and nuclear advancements and its increasingly bellicose stance toward South Korea and the U.S. ().

18. News.az (2023). Interview with Ian Bremmer. (Dec 2023). Political risk expert Ian Bremmer emphasizes that while the risk of a Third World War remains, it is “a very low risk, but certainly not zero,” given Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and confrontation with NATO (Ian Bremmer to News.Az: The risk of a Third World War remains, but …).

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Geopolitical Shiefts in Global Energy Trade…

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Introduction

The global energy trade is undergoing significant shifts driven by geopolitics. Sanctions, strategic alliances, and competition over emerging energy technologies are reshaping traditional oil and gas flows. Russia’s confrontation with the West has accelerated its pivot toward Asia, bolstering energy ties with China and India. In parallel, Saudi Arabia and Russia lead an expanded OPEC+ alliance aimed at managing oil markets. Energy resources are increasingly wielded as geopolitical tools – from Russia’s natural gas cutoffs to Saudi-Russian coordination influencing oil prices. Meanwhile, a strategic rivalry is unfolding between the United States and China over clean energy supply chains and technological leadership.

This paper analyzes these dynamics in seven parts: (1) Russia’s pivot to South Asia and rising energy trade with India and China; (2) the emergence of a Russia-China-India energy bloc and its impact on global markets; (3) the strategic alliance within OPEC+ for oil price stabilization; (4) the use of energy as a geopolitical tool, including Russian gas supply leverage and Saudi-Russian cooperation; (5) U.S.-China competition in clean energy technologies and supply chains; (6) the impact of a second Trump presidency on the global energy sector; and (7) the implications of tariffs on oil and natural gas trade affecting key partners (Mexico, China, Canada). The analysis draws on current data and developments, presenting a clear argument with supporting evidence.

Russia’s Pivot to South Asia: Growing Energy Trade with India and China

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the ensuing Western sanctions severed much of Moscow’s longstanding energy trade with Europe. In response, Russia has aggressively redirected its oil and gas exports toward more receptive markets in South Asia and the Far East. China and India have emerged as critical buyers of Russian energy, partially filling the void left by Europe’s retreat. In 2023, Russia’s trade with China surged by about 63% to over $240 billion, while trade with India quadrupled from 2021 levels to reach $65 billion. These figures mean Russia’s trade with China and India each exceeded its pre-war trade with the entire European Union.

India, which previously bought little Russian oil, has made it a pillar of its energy supply. Indian refiners are not only fueling domestic growth with cheap Russian crude but also re-exporting refined products (like diesel) to Western markets. China has elevated Russia to be its top crude supplier, ahead of even Saudi Arabia. By 2023, roughly 80% of Russia’s crude exports were flowing to Asia, a dramatic reorientation from the Europe-centric trade of prior decades.

A Russia–China–India Energy Bloc and Its Global Impact

The deepening energy ties among Russia, China, and India have raised the prospect of an emerging “energy bloc” that could challenge Western dominance in global energy markets. While not a formal alliance, the convergence of interests among these three powers is noteworthy. Russia is a resource-exporting giant seeking non-Western markets; China and India are the world’s largest and third-largest oil importers, respectively, hungry for affordable energy to fuel their growth. All three are members of BRICS, and both China and India have pointedly refused to join Western sanctions on Russia.

This tacit alignment has enabled Russia to successfully divert most of its seaborne oil exports from Europe to Asia, undermining the intended effect of Western embargoes and price caps. The collective weight of a Russia-China-India bloc in energy is substantial: together, they account for a large share of both supply and demand in certain markets. The de-dollarization of energy trade could, over time, weaken the financial leverage of Western sanctions, as alternative payment systems and insurance networks develop around this bloc.

The OPEC+ Alliance: Saudi-Russian Partnership and Oil Price Stabilization

A parallel development in global energy geopolitics is the entrenchment of the OPEC+ alliance, which binds the OPEC cartel (led by Saudi Arabia) with non-OPEC oil producers, foremost among them Russia. Since its formal inception in late 2016, OPEC+ has been a strategic partnership aimed at managing oil production to influence prices. The Saudi-Russian tandem at the heart of OPEC+ represents an alignment of two of the world’s top three oil producers. The alliance has proven effective in stabilizing oil prices and maintaining revenue certainty for key producers.

Energy as a Geopolitical Tool: Gas Cutoffs and Oil Diplomacy

Control over energy supplies has long been wielded as a geopolitical instrument. Russia’s natural gas cutoffs to Europe in 2021–2022 are a textbook example of energy leverage. By the winter of 2022, Russian pipeline gas exports to Europe had fallen by over 80%, plunging the continent into an energy crisis. This has forced Europe to accelerate alternative arrangements, importing LNG from the U.S. and Qatar, refiring coal plants, and even extending nuclear plant operations. While Russia’s moves inflicted economic pain, they ultimately failed to fracture Western unity, as Europe adapted and reduced dependency on Russian energy.

On the oil front, Saudi-Russian cooperation in OPEC+ has had geopolitical ripple effects. Its coordinated production cuts have periodically influenced global oil prices, sometimes aligning with strategic goals that diverge from Western interests.

U.S.–China Competition in Clean Energy Technologies and Supply Chains

The United States and China are in direct competition to command the industries of the future – from solar panels and wind turbines to electric vehicles (EVs) and the critical minerals that make them possible. Over the past decade, China has come to dominate global clean energy manufacturing. It controls the lion’s share of production capacity in solar photovoltaics, batteries, and critical minerals processing.

The U.S. has responded by attempting to reduce dependence on Chinese supply chains through industrial policies and strategic partnerships. However, China’s advantage in cost efficiency and raw material processing remains significant. The race for dominance in clean energy supply chains will define the next phase of global energy geopolitics.

The Impact of a Second Trump Presidency on the Global Energy Sector

¨A Shock to the System…

The global electricity sector, encompassing power generation, transmission, and distribution, is profoundly influenced by geopolitical shifts, energy policy decisions, and trade dynamics. A second Trump presidency would have significant implications for the industry in three major areas:

1. Energy Market Volatility and Fossil Fuel Prioritization

2. Global Supply Chain Disruptions for Electrical Equipment

3. Geopolitical Risks and Investment Shifts in Renewable Energy

1. Energy Market Volatility and Fossil Fuel Prioritization

One of the most immediate effects of Trump’s return to office would be a fundamental shift in U.S. energy policy, moving away from climate-focused policies and back to fossil fuel expansion. Trump has already stated that he would lift regulations on coal, oil, and natural gas production, and withdraw U.S. commitments to international climate goals such as the Paris Agreement. This would have the following effects on the electrical sector:

Increased Natural Gas and Coal-Fired Power Generation:

1. Trump’s energy policies in his first term led to a 30% expansion in U.S. liquefied natural gas (LNG) exports. His second term would likely see further deregulation, incentivizing utilities to build or extend the life of fossil-fuel power plants rather than investing in renewable energy.

2. In regions dependent on U.S. LNG exports (e.g., Europe, Japan, and South Korea), price volatility could increase as energy policy shifts disrupt supply chains.

3. The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) regulations on emissions would likely be rolled back, reducing the pressure on power plants to adopt cleaner technologies.

   Weakened Support for Renewable Energy Development:

4. Under Trump’s first term, renewable energy incentives were significantly reduced, and there were efforts to cancel tax credits for solar and wind power. A similar trend is expected in his second term.

5. Utilities and power producers that had committed to carbon-neutral electricity by 2030 or 2050 may face policy uncertainty, which could delay large-scale investments in renewables.

6. Wind and solar energy infrastructure projects often depend on federal tax credits and incentives. With Trump likely ending or reducing these subsidies, private investment in green energy may slow down, particularly in the U.S.

   Impact on the European Energy Market:

7. Trump has suggested that the U.S. might reduce military and energy commitments to NATO allies, which could force European nations to accelerate their own energy independence strategies.

8. This could lead to increased European-based energy projects, including offshore wind, nuclear, and hydrogen production.

Trump’s policies would favor fossil fuels over renewables, leading to a temporary resurgence in coal and gas-powered electricity generation, particularly in markets where U.S. exports play a key role. However, this could slow progress toward net-zero carbon targets and introduce market uncertainty for long-term electrical infrastructure investments.

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2. Global Supply Chain Disruptions for Electrical Equipment

Trump’s protectionist trade policies, particularly in the electrical manufacturing sector, could disrupt global supply chains for power infrastructure, including transformers, batteries, solar panels, and transmission equipment.

Renewed Tariffs on Electrical Equipment from China and Asia:

1. Trump has already floated 60% tariffs on Chinese imports, which would impact electrical components, semiconductors, and grid infrastructure materials.

2. Solar panels, wind turbines, and lithium batteries are heavily dependent on Chinese and Southeast Asian manufacturing. Increased tariffs could raise costs for energy developers, making renewable energy projects more expensive and less competitive in the U.S.

3. In response, China might retaliate by limiting exports of rare earth minerals, which are crucial for high-efficiency electrical components, electric vehicles (EVs), and smart grid technology.

    

   Impact on High-Voltage Grid Components and Smart Grid Development:

    

4. Many high-voltage transformers used in the U.S. and Europe rely on imported steel and electrical laminations from China, South Korea, and Mexico.

5. If Trump escalates trade restrictions, utilities could face supply shortages, leading to delays in grid modernization and higher costs for infrastructure projects.

6. The rollout of smart grids—which rely on advanced semiconductors and sensors—could slow down if key microelectronics suppliers (such as those in Taiwan and South Korea) experience geopolitical tensions or disruptions.

    

   Increased Investment in Domestic Manufacturing (But at Higher Costs):

7. While Trump’s trade policies might incentivize onshoring electrical manufacturing, the transition would be costly and slow, making short-term grid investments more expensive.

8. The U.S. electrical industry could rely more on domestic suppliers, but at the cost of higher prices and delayed projects.

Trade wars and tariffs under Trumps administrations would create higher costs and supply chain bottlenecks for electrical infrastructure, particularly in the renewable energy sector and grid modernization projects. Countries relying on imported transformers, semiconductors, and solar components could face price hikes and slower deployment.

3. Geopolitical Risks and Investment Shifts in Renewable Energy

Russia and China’s Influence on Global Energy Markets

1. Trump’s weaker stance on Russia could affect global oil and gas pricing and shift energy partnerships.

2. Russia might increase its dominance in supplying fossil fuels, while China strengthens supply chains for renewable energy components.

3. China has positioned itself as the largest producer of solar panels, batteries, and wind turbines, and could use a Trump-led trade war to expand its dominance in the electrical infrastructure market, supplying countries that are cut off from U.S. exports.

    

   Investment Shifts Toward European and Asian Markets:

4. As the U.S. reduces incentives for renewable energy, investors may divert capital to Europe, Japan, and China, where government policies continue to support the transition.

5. The EU Green Deal, China’s Five-Year Energy Plan, and Japan’s hydrogen development strategy could see higher investment inflows, while U.S. electrical infrastructure investment stagnates.

    

   Cybersecurity Risks to Electrical Grids:

6. Trump’s weakened alliances with NATO and international cybersecurity bodies could increase vulnerabilities in electrical infrastructure.

7. Russia and China have previously targeted U.S. and European power grids with cyberattacks, and a breakdown in global cooperation on cybersecurity could leave electrical grids more exposed to hacking and sabotage.

8. The U.S. power sector would need to increase private investment in cybersecurity defenses to compensate for weaker international coordination.

The electrical sector would face a major geopolitical realignment under Trump. While U.S. energy policy shifts toward domestic fossil fuels, global investors may pivot toward Europe and Asia, where renewables remain a priority. Additionally, trade tensions could exacerbate cybersecurity risks, requiring new defensive investments in grid infrastructure.

With Trump back in office, U.S. energy policy is shifting sharply toward fossil fuel expansion. The administration has lifted restrictions on drilling, fast-tracked pipeline approvals, and reduced regulatory oversight of coal and natural gas projects. Trump has distanced the U.S. from European energy priorities and re-emphasized energy independence, focusing on domestic production rather than climate-focused policies.

This has led to increased U.S. oil and gas output, making American energy more competitive globally. But it has also strained transatlantic relations, as European nations move ahead with decarbonization efforts while the U.S. prioritizes fossil fuels.

Tariffs and Energy Trade: Implications for Mexico, China, and Canada

Trade policy under Trump has introduced new uncertainties into global energy markets. Tariffs on Chinese imports have affected the cost of renewable energy components, while potential tariffs on oil and gas exports could disrupt trade with Mexico and Canada. The U.S.’s growing energy independence has allowed it to use trade policy as a strategic tool, reshaping energy alliances and shifting investment patterns.

Conclusion: Future Outlook for Global Energy Markets

The global energy landscape is experiencing a rapid transformation. Russia’s pivot to Asia, the rise of the Russia-China-India energy bloc, and the strategic role of OPEC+ have reshaped traditional energy flows. Meanwhile, the rivalry between the U.S. and China in clean energy technologies is intensifying. Under Trump, U.S. energy policy is reinforcing fossil fuel production while retreating from international climate commitments. These shifts will define global energy security and economic stability in the years to come.

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References

Briggs, Kaitlin, and Jonathan Elkind. Global Gas Dynamics as Russia Pivots Markets to China. New York: Columbia SIPA Center on Global Energy Policy, 2023.

International Energy Agency (IEA). Solar PV Global Supply Chains. Paris: IEA, July 2022.

Laron, Guy. “The OPEC+ Puzzle: Why Russian-Saudi Cooperation Starts – and Stops – with Oil Prices.” Wilson Center, January 19, 2023.

Lipscy, Josh, and Niels Graham. “China is Trading More with Russia—but so are Many US Allies and Partners.” Atlantic Council, May 30, 2023.

Shaffer, Brenda. Energy Politics. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2011.

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Civillini, Matteo, Megan Rowling, and Joe Lo. “What Trump’s Second Term Means for Climate Action in the US and Beyond.” Climate Home News, January 15, 2025.

Faulconbridge, Guy, and Vladimir Soldatkin. “Russia and Saudi Arabia Urge All OPEC+ Powers to Join Oil Cuts.” Reuters, December 7, 2023.

Kossov, Igor. “Sanctions for Show: Russian Oil Sales to China, India Single Main Driver of Ukraine Invasion.” The Kyiv Independent, February 23, 2024.

Morgan, David, David Lawder, and Leah Douglas. “Trump Will Set Exact Levels for Mexico, Canada Tariffs Coming Tuesday, Says US Commerce Chief.” Reuters, March 3, 2025.

Russell, Clyde. “Rising Flow of Russian Oil Products to China, India and the Middle East.” Reuters, February 16, 2023.

Williams, Curtis. “Trade War with China Casts Dark Cloud Over New US LNG Projects.” Reuters, February 4, 2025.

Yermakov, Vadim. “Russia Pivots South for Trade Following Western European Sanctions.” Modern Diplomacy, March 15, 2024.
(Chicago-style references for all sources used in the paper)